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Elison: Assigned Counsel in Montana: The Law and The Practice

Assigned Counsel in Montana: The Law and The Practice*
Larry M. Elison**
The Anglo-American system of accusatorial, adversary criminal justice fills the average law student, if not most practicing lawyers, with
visions of glamorized legal drama and pride of profession. Whether it
should be a source of pride is questionable. Surely a legal battle between
sometimes poorly matched antagonists with the fate of a third person
in the balance is not an arrangement calculated to inspire the greatest confidence in the truth and justice of the verdict produced. The source of
legal pride might be further questioned when it is derived from the successful prosecution or defense of a seemingly impossible case, especially
one in which the successful protagonist had little belief in the justice of
his cause. Yet these victories are often the most highly regarded. Surely,
however, there can be no pride when the very core of the system is subverted. In a trial conducted without counsel the accusatorial, adversary
approach is not only subject to criticism for its inherent shortcomings,
but moreover, it becomes a hollow mockery of itself. The critical impor-

tance of legal counsel causes one to speculate: Why have the courts been
so dilatory in requiring that counsel be made available to all defendants as
an essential of basic legal fairness-constitutional due process? The problem has most often been considered and lamented in the case of the indigent
criminal defendant.
In 1963 the American Bar Association commenced a national study
under the research supervision of the American Bar Foundation to ascertain the procedures followed in each state in providing legal representation for indigent accused persons. Reporters, appointed in each state,
worked with state bar association committees to gather the desired information. The field study in Montana was conducted by personal interviews, written questionnaires and docket studies.' Personal interviews
were conducted in the five counties of Yellowstone, Cascade, Lewis and
Clark, Ravalli and Musselshell. Docket studies were completed in Yellowstone, Cascade and Ravalli counties. These studies consisted of random
samplings of cases in each of the three counties selected, followed by a
complete examination of the selected cases by reviewing the docket sheets,
minute entries and police records insofar as they were accessible. The
*Field work for this article was carried out under the direction of Lee Silverstein, Esq.,
Project Director of the American Bar Association's nationwide study of representation of indigent defendants, and under the research supervision of the American Bar
Foundation.
"A.B., Idaho State College; LL.B., University of Utah; S.J.D., University of Michigan; Professor of Law, Montana State University.
'The Montana field study was conducted in July, August and September of 1963.
Personal interviews were held with members of the judiciary and the county attorney's office in each of the five counties included in the sample. Questionnaires
were sent to all district court judges, all county attorneys and to defense attorneys
who had represented indigent defendants in the five sample counties. The statistical
information obtained from the field study is recorded in the tables following this
article. See apps., Tables I through X.
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remainder of the state was canvassed by questionnaires. The sum total
of the informatiun gathered forms the basis for this article insofar as it
relates to the practices followed in providing defense counsel for indigent
accused persons in the state of Montana. Hopefully the report is an
accurate one, both for the sake of accuracy and because it is, in many
respects, favorable.
The Montana law providing assigned counsel for indigent accused
persons was originally enacted in 1871, eighteen years before Montana
was admitted to statehood. The law of 1871 provided for assigned counsel, at the request of any accused person "about to be arraigned upon an
indictment for a felony. . . ."' The present law, while similar to its nine-

teenth century predecessor has been expanded to include all indigent
defendants who appear for arraignment, including not only felonies but
also high misdemeanors over which the district courts have exclusive
original jurisdiction.3 The present law further liberalizes the procedure
for providing assigned counsel by requiring the court to ask the defendant
if he desires counsel rather than requiring the defendant to request
counsel. Whether this particular change made any practical difference
in the availability of counsel for indigent accused persons is impossible
to ascertain. However, an accused person uninformed of his right to free
counsel may be quite as imposed 4upon as one informed of a right he cannot exercise because of poverty.
The time for providing assigned counsel as established by statute
has not changed since 1871. It is still required that the assignment be
made when the defendant appears for arraignment. " However, in the
recent case of Alden v. Montana,6 the Federal District Court for the District of Montana held that assigned counsel7 is required at preliminary
examination on a non-capital felony charge.
A companion statute providing compensation for an assigned attorney was passed in 1881. 8 The original law allowed the judge to certify
"reasonable compensation" for the attorney's labor not to exceed $50 in
any capital case, $25 in a non-capital felony case and $10 in any other
caseY In 1903 the maximum limits of compensation were raised to $100
Practice Act, Laws of Montana 1871-72, ch. 9, § 196, at 220. "If any
person about to be arraigned upon an indictment for felony, be without counsel to
conduct his defense, and he be unable to employ any, it shall be the duty of the
court to assign him counsel, at his request, not exceeding two, who shall have free
access to the prisoner, at all reasonable times."
3REvIsED CODES OF MONTANA, 1947, § 94-6512. Hereinafter REVISED CODES OF MONTANA are cited R.C.M.
4
This problem is currently at issue in Rohrer v. Montana, petition filed, Civil No.
1203, D. Mont., Nov. 25, 1964, before Federal District Court Judge Murray on petition for writ of habeas corpus.
5
Criminal Practice Act, Laws of Montana 1871-72, ch. 9, § 196, at 220; R.C.M. 1947,
§ 94-6512.
6234 F. Supp. 661 (D. Mont. 1964).
'In reaching this conclusion the district court judge relied on the United States
Supreme Court decision of White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963).
8
Compensation of Counsel, Laws of Montana 1881, § 1, at 12.
'Compensation of Counsel, Laws of Montana 1881, § 1, at 12.
2Criminal
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in a capital case, $50 in a non-capital felony case and $25 in any other
case. 10 Finally in 1949 the law was amended by deleting all maximums
and relying exclusively on the more flexible guide of "reasonable compensation" as certified by the district court judge." The deletion of
12
dollar limits has resulted in an increase in the fees paid assigned counsel.
However, for the most part the fees certified by the district court judges
are relatively modest and not fairly subject to criticism.'3
FOR WHOM IS COUNSEL APPOINTED?
By statute, appointed counsel must be made available to all indigent
defendants who desire counsel and appear for arraignment in district
court. 1 4 This means counsel is assigned for indigent defendants charged
with felonies or high misdemeanors unless counsel is waived."
When the accused is presented for arraignment he is asked if he
has the means to retain counsel. If he gives a negative answer counsel is
appointed unless waived. This procedure is apparently followed with
some care throughout the state. However, a case is presently before the
Montana Federal District Court on petition for writ of habeas corpus in
which one of the allegations made by the petitioner is that he was asked
only if he wanted counsel and was not advised that counsel would be
furnished for him at state expense. He claimed that he waived counsel
because he did not think he could afford a lawyer.' 6 The prosecuting
attorney who was examined at the hearing refused to commit himself as
to whether the defendant was ever advised that counsel would be fur7
nished at state expense.'
Some judges explain the nature of the offense, the possible penalty
that may be invoked, the significance of the arraignment and the importance of counsel.' 8 Many district court judges almost insist that counsel
be appointed. This is especially true in the case of youthful first offenders
whom the court desires to protect from their own ignorance of criminal
proceedings. A less sympathetic but more obvious motive for this insistence
is to protect the trial court record and to fend against the danger of
having a conviction attacked collaterally by a petition for writ of habeas
corpus after the evidence has evaporated.
In none of the sample counties is counsel provided for persons
'°Laws of Montana 1903, ch. 33, § 1, at 46.
-R.C.M. 1947, § 94-6513.
12
See Table II (amounts paid on guilty plea) and Table V (county costs for furnishing
counsel).
Ibid.
"1R.C.M. 1947, § 94-6512.
-R.C.M. 1947, § 94-6512, -4916, -4917.
"Rohrer v. Montana, supra note 4
171bid.
ISupra note 1.
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charged with misdemeanors. 19 This appears to be the pattern throughout
the state, although in one county, not included in the sample, the county
attorney stated that counsel is regularly offered to persons charged with
20
misdemeanors.
For the most part neither judges nor county attorneys favor the
appointment of counsel in misdemeanor cases. 21 It was the consensus of
the state judiciary that court appointed counsel for the defense of indigents accused of misdemeanors would place an unjustifiable burden on the
bench, the bar and the taxpayer. 22 However, in the final analysis federal
interpretations of "fair process" may require assigned counsel for persons
charged with misdemeanors regardless of the attitude of the state bench
and bar and notwithstanding the financial, administrative or legal burden
it may entail.
Apart from Montana's internal law and practice in providing counsel
for indigent defendants and of more immediate and critical import to
members of the state bench and bar are the expanding requirements of
due process imposed by the federal constitution. The Supreme Court,
keeper of our national conscience, only recently has concerned itself
with the problem of providing adequate legal assistance to the indigent
accused.23 In retrospect the slowness of the Supreme Court in requiring
counsel for the indigent is difficult to fathom. If our adversary system
of criminal justice has merit it surely must presuppose some equality of
understanding and ability between the adversaries. Perhaps the legacy of
history diverted the Court's attention for it was not until 1836 in England
that the right to counsel was "formally given to defendants in cases of
felonies other than treason. '24 In examining the theoretical basis of
Anglo-American criminal justice and its reliance upon conflict to find
truth, the failure to allow counsel must surely appear farcical in the
extreme to future historians. In its diliatory extension of the right to
but also as
counsel to the indigent it should appear not only as farcical,
25
a system giving full weight to the advantages of wealth.
Once embarking on its course to make counsel available for indigent
accused persons, the Supreme Court moved cautiously. In Betts v.
Brady,26 following the decision in Johnson v. Zerbst 27 the Court refused
"Supra note 1; Cf. Table IV.
'OInterview With Russell K. Fillner, County Attorney, Forsyth, Montana, Jan., 1964.
County Attorney Fillner commented further that it has been his experience that
persons accused of misdemeanors do not desire legal counsel.
"See Table IV.
2Supra note 1; cf. note 20 supra.
2See, e.g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963); White v. Maryland, supra note 7.
2Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARv. L. REV. 1 (1956).
2
The defendant's right to counsel was constitutionally recognized in this country with
the ratification of the first ten amendments to the Constitution in 1791. See U. S.
CONST. amend. VI, and MONT. CONST. art III, § 16.
-316 U.S. 455 (1942).
1Supra note 23.
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol26/iss1/1
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to apply to the states the requirement found in the sixth amendment
that federal indigent defendants be furnished counsel. The Court, in
Betts would go no farther than to say that since the fourteenth amendment gives no "inexorable command" for representation by counsel in
every trial and since the petitioner before the Court was not subjected
to a trial that was "offensive to the common and fundamental ideas of
fairness and right ... ,28 the conviction must be affirmed.
Perhaps the most logically reasoned portion of the opinion was the
most detrimental. That was the all or nothing approach which reasoned
that if counsel must be furnished to this criminal defendant who was not
subjected to a trial that was offensive to .common and fundamental ideas
of fairness, then all indigent criminal defendants have an equally legitimate claim to appointed counsel, and further yet, since the fourteenth
amendment due process clause includes property as well as life, indigent
29
parties to civil litigation likewise could demand appointed counsel.
The reasoning is not without logic nor without justification.30 The unfortunate element of such a dryly logical conclusion is that it fails to take
clear notice of the inherent nature of constitutional law as an organic
and changing thing. Willingness to draw lines, and for that matter, to be
internally inconsistent may be one of the less exacting costs of ordered
constitutional change. Nonetheless, since the Court was not prepared to
go all the way, it failed to place more specific content in the words
"fundamental fairness" beyond answering the case before the Court
by finding no fundamental unfairness. This negative answer seemed
to temporarily thwart further expansion of the concept of "fundamental
fairness" in the area of assigned counsel. However, the refusal to give
more expansive, as well as more specific content to the command of the
fourteenth amendment was in its nature only a temproary refusal. More
cases questioning the "fundamental fairness" of state criminal prosecutions were anxious to be heard and the Supreme Court was not prepared
to reject them all. In 1962 the Court per Justice Douglas, held that
because an habitual criminal charge was sufficiently serious and the
issues sufficiently complex, conduct of the trial of such a charge without
the presence of defense counsel was violative of fourteenth amendment
due process.31 And by 1963 the Court was prepared to make its momentous
decision in Gideon v. Wainwright,32 specifically overruling Betts v.
33
Brady.
'Supra note 26, at 473.
2DIbid.

'There is little good reason why an economically solvent litigant should have the
incomparable advantage of counsel of which the destitute litigant is denied unless
it be to insure that existing economic advantages not be disturbed. In the case of
tort litigation it was this obvious inequity that led to the questionable practice of
the contingent fee.
"Chewning v. Cunningham, 368 U.S. 443 (1962).
"Supra note 23.
"Supra note 26; See also the following pre-Gideon cases which eroded the holding in
Betts: Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3 (1954); Kinsella v. U.S. ex rel. Singleton,
361byU.S.
234 (1960); atFerguson
v. of
Georgia,
365 1964
U.S. 570 (1961); Hamilton v. AlaPublished
ScholarWorks
University
Montana,
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Gideon v.Wainwright must at the very least stand for the proposition that due process requires state appointed counsel for indigent
accused persons charged with any offense which carries "the possibility
of a substantial prison sentence. '34 The language and reasoning of the
Court expressed in the majority opinion of Mr. Justice Black in his
vehement attack on the opinion and decision in Betts v. Brady would
certainly permit a more expanded interpretation:
[R]eason and reflection require us to recognize that in our
adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into
court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair
trial unless counsel is provided for him. 35 (Emphasis added.)
Further, Mr. Justice Clark's concurrence is express in terms of destroying
the illogical and unauthoritative distinction between capital and noncapital offenses as to the due process requirement of appointed counsel. 36
The thrust of his argument would cut equally well against an "arbitrary"
distinction between felonies and misdemeanors. Thus an expansive theory
of the case may be more realistic than any attempt to limit the decision
narrowly to its facts.
Bolstered by the reasoning in Douglas v. California37 existing federal
standards might fairly be construed as requiring that indigent accused
persons are constitutionally entitled to appointed counsel in all criminal
cases. Douglas v. California,3s was perhaps less striking in its impact
simply because it followed Gideon, but may become more significant
because it founded a right to appointed counsel for a criminal appeal
on the constitutional requirements of equality between rich and poor.
If the language in Douglas is liberally followed the constitutional
standard might well require appointment of counsel for the poor in any
case in which a wealthy man has a right to the assistance and presence of
retained counsel.

39

If the federal decisions are narrowly limited to their facts the procedure presently employed in Montana, at least as to the persons for
whom counsel must be employed, is in conformity with the federal law
as applied to the states. 40 If we allow more breadth to the constitutional
decisions, if we take cognizance of the direction in which the Court is
moving and if we remain alive to the notion that constitutional law is
bama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961); Chewning v. Cunningham, supra note 31. For a careful
development and explanation of this erosion see LOCKART, KAMISAR, & CHOPER, CONSTITUTIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

(1964).

"Gideon v. Wainwright, supra note 23, at 351 (Harlan, J., concurring).
3'Gideon v. Wainwright, supra note 23, at 344.
3'Gideon v. Wainwright, supra note 23, at 347 (Clark, J., concurring).
-372 U.S. 353 (1963).
38Ibid.

3Ibid.
'0See R.C.M. 1947, § 94-6512 relating to appointment of counsel at arraignment in
district court. See text infra at 14 - 16 regarding appointment of counsel for indigent

appellants in Montana.
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol26/iss1/1
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organic in nature, we must quickly concede that the Montana law, even
as to persons for whom counsel must be provided, is not going to remain
adequate.
The question is very urgent and the problems to be faced are substantial. How can an expanded system of assigned counsel be financed?
Can it be effectively administered? What must it be to accord with
"fundamental fairness" and "due process"? Should we experiment with
a public defender? The questions are obvious. The answers must be
uncertain. In 1963, following the legislative session, a Criminal Law
Commission was organized pursuant to legislative authorization 4 1 and
under the direction of Associate Justice Wesley Castles. 42 This Commission has carefully reviewed the problem of assigned counsel. The tentative solution reached by the Commission will conform with the demands
of "federal due process" whatever that concept is found to contain as
it relates to requirements of counsel for the indigent defendant. Whether
the proposal will prove costly and administratively cumbersome cannot
be answered with absolute certainty. It is the consensus of the members
of the Commission that it is the best possible answer to the problem.
Basically, the proposal is: that as soon as the defendant charged with a
felony is presented before any judicial officer he shall be advised of his
right to counsel and that he is entitled to assigned counsel at state expense if he is financially unable to employ an attorney. The assignment
of counsel would be made by a court of record and counsel would be
available for all stages o the criminal process. If the offense charged
were a misdemeanor and the accused were unable to employ counsel,
counsel would be appointed if in the judgment of the district court,
justice required the appointment. The defendant would be allowed to
waive counsel, except that in all felony cases, if the defendant was under
eighteen years of age he would be represented by counsel at every stage
of the criminal process and waiver would not be allowed.
Since the right to assigned counsel extends only to persons unable
to employ an attorney it is essential that the court has some legitimate
standard or method of determining if the defendant is unable to employ
counsel. 43 There are many factors that might be considered, such as
salary or wages, ownership of property, savings, investments, pensions,
unemployment compensation, social security, and resources of spouse,
parents, or relatives. Also the defendant's ability to post bail may be
another consideration. In practice, investigation of indigency in Montana
is more by chance than by plan; and unless rebutting evidence is per-R.C.M. 1947, § 94-1001-1.
"The Commission is composed of judges from the Supreme Court of Montana and the
district courts, practicing attorneys representing both prosecutors and defense counsel,
and faculty members of the Montana State University Law School. In addition to
Associate Justice Castles the members of the Commission are: Hon. Robert J. Nelson,
Hon. W. W. Lessley, Hon. E. Gardner Brownlee, Louis Forsell, Esq., Russell K.
Fillner, Esq., William F. Crowley, Esq., M. Dean Jellison, Esq., Charles F. Moses,
Esq., John M. McCarvel, Esq., Prof. Edwin W. Briggs and Prof. Larry M. Elison.
-R.C.M.
1947, § 94-6512.
Published
by ScholarWorks
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sonally known to the sheriff's office, the county attorney or the judge
the defendant's own statement of indigency is usually accepted. 4 Although most of the replies from judges and county attorneys agreed that
the determination of indigency is lenient, few thought it too lenient. The
consensus of both prosecutors and judges in the state of Montana is
that there is no abuse of the right to free counsel. In most cases, if an
accused claiming indigency has some source of income, or available
property it is generally limited and if the claimed indigent is forced
to exhaust his limited funds it is not unlikely that it would create added
45
strain on the county budget at some other point.

Since the approach to the problem of determining indigency is liberal
and does not seem to loom as a formidable obstacle, there is practically
no case commentary on the question and very little attention has been
given to any articulated standard. One Montana case that seemed to
raise the question involved the attempt to obtain counsel at state expense
by a defendant who had previously posted a $10,000 cash bond. The
court was of the opinion that the ability to post a bond of this size
indicated an ability to employ counsel and the failure to appoint counsel
did not constitute a denial of his constitutional rights. 46 While the particular case probably raises no substantial problem, many cases undoubtedly do appear before the court in which an accused person has sufficient
money to either post bond or employ an attorney, but not both. Should
a defendant be required to elect between obtaining his release on bail
and employing an attorney? This is only the periphery of the entire
question of indigency. How should a relatively poor person be treated
who has money to pay counsel but only at the expense of family savings,
mortgaging his home, selling his means of transportation or any number
of other financially destructive and morally depressing sacrifices? Theoretically if an accused has resources he must employ his own counsel
and the court should not be concerned with the extent of his resources.
What of the poor person whose financial solvency terminates during the
course of his defense? Is he entitled to assigned counsel at state expense,
or must his retained counsel continue in the case as a matter of professional responsibility? One might further question the basic fairness of
requiring a wealthy man to exhaust his resources to defend his innocence
while an indigent person defends his innocence at state expense. Perhaps
this line of reasoning argues best for the establishment of a public
defender system which is available for the defense of all persons charged
with crime. If a well-to-do person is not satisfied with the calibre of
the public defender's office he would be free to employ his own counsel.
This would assure a minimum level of defense available to all persons
charged with crime without regard to race, color, creed or wealth.
"Supra note 1.

'"Forexample, the welfare department might be required to attend to the needs of the
accused 's family.
"State v. Fowler, 59 Mont. 346, 197 Pac. 847 (1921).
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol26/iss1/1
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AT WHAT STAGE IS COUNSEL FIRST MADE AVAILABLE?
The practical pattern of criminal procedure in Montana is substantially influenced by constitutional and statutory provisions permitting a
criminal action to be commenced without an indictment and without a
preliminary examination.4
A majority of all felony prosecutions are
initiated by information after leave to file has been granted by the district court judge. 48 This procedure bypasses the preliminary examination
and theoretically substitutes a hearing before a district judge. The hearing must not "be considered as a merely perfunctory one,"'49 although
it is doubtful that the hearing is much more than perfunctory in most
cases.50 In some rural counties where the district judge is not regularly
available the prosecutor may initiate most felony prosecutions by preliminary examination. However, this can be misleading since practically all
preliminary examinations are evidently waived. 51 One county attorney
claimed that he initiated all felony prosecutions by preliminary examination, adding, "I use a little psychology on the accused and he waives
the preliminary examination, consequently I've never had a preliminary
examination. 5 2 The case and statutory law supplemented by field
research leads to the conclusion that a preliminary examination is not a
regular procedural step in Montana. For this reason it may be that there
is little justification for appointment of assigned counsel at preliminary
53
examination.
The Supreme Court in White v. Maryland54 determined that a preliminary examination in Maryland in the case of petitioner White was a
"critical" stage of the proceedings and without determining whether
prejudice resulted concluded that lack of counsel at the preliminary
hearing required reversal of the conviction. 55 Does this mean that it is
essential to fair process that counsel be assigned at or before the preliminary examination in Montana? It might be argued that district court
arraignment is early enough to provide counsel in Montana since the
preliminary examination is not a regular procedural step. This would be
in basic conformity with answers received from defense counsel in
the state, a majority of whom maintained that counsel is appointed early
CONST. art. III, § 8; R.C.M. 1947, § 94-6204; Comment, Initiation of Prosecution by Information-Leave of Court or Preliminary Examination?, 25 MONT. L.

"MONT.

REV. 135 (1963).

"See app. A in Comment, 25 MONT. L. REV. 135, 143 (1963).
"State ex rel. Juhl v. District Court, 107 Mont. 309, 316, 84 P.2d 979 (1938).
mSupra note 1. But cf. State ex rel. Donovan v. District Court, 26 Mont. 275, 67 Pac.
943 (1902); State ex rel. Harrison v. District Court, 135 Mont. 365, 340 P.2d 544
(1959); State ex rel. McLatchy v. District Court, 395 P.2d 245 (Mont. 1964).
5'Supra note 1. This conclusion is supported by docket studies conducted in the sample
counties.
5Supra

note 1.

53But see White v. Maryland, supra note 7. It should be noted that Maryland's use
of the preliminary examination in that particular case included allowing the defendant
to plead to the charge.
"Supra note 7.
"Id. by
at ScholarWorks
60.
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enough under the existing practice, i.e. at arraignment.5
However, this
overlooks the obvious. If there is a preliminary examination, by its very
nature it may be a critical stage of the proceedings and the right to
assigned counsel would then be a requirement of due process. In Alden v.
Montana57 the Federal District Court, for the District of Montana, in
ruling on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus stated:
The combination of the County Attorney informing petitioner,
in effect, that his prior convictions would not be filed against
him if he pled guilty, but that they would be filed if he pled not
guilty, together with the failure of the State to provide the
assistance of counsel at the preliminary hearing, resulted in
pleas of guilty that cannot stand in the face of the due process
requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. 58
The federal district court relied on White v. Maryland59 and Hamilton
v. Alabama60 which it claimed "make . . .clear that . . .right to counsel
exists at all stages of the proceedings, and particularly at the preliminary
hearing before the magistrate'61 Although a plea of guilty was entered
by the defendant in justice court in the Alden case there was no preliminary examination since the preliminary examination was waived. Further,
the plea of guilty should in law have amounted to no more than a waiver
of preliminary examination. Finally, the county attorney was not required to hold a preliminary examination and it is doubtful that he
would have held one. He could have dismissed the complaint in justice
court and made application for leave to file in the district court.6 2 In
view of these procedural facts it is questionable if the proceeding through
which defendant, Alden, was carried prior to his arraignment in district
court was "critical", at least in the same sense the preliminary examination in Maryland was considered to be critical by the Supreme Court
63
in White v. Maryland.
In Alden the federal district court made the expected and logical
extension of the Hamilton and White cases to include other than capital
crimes.6 4 The federal court also pointed out that the Supreme Court
did not base its holding on a showing of prejudice in either Hamilton or
White.6 5 However, the federal court failed to make a careful review of
the proceeding at which defendant Alden was denied the assistance of
counsel. It was not an arraignment or a preliminary examination but
MSupra note 1. Also, see Table III.
51234 F. Supp. 661 (D. Mont. 1964).
"Id. at 670.
-373 U.S. 59 (1963).
Supra note 33.

"Alden v. Montana, supra note 57, at 670.
§ 8; R.C.M. 1947, § 94-6204.

nMONT. CoNsT. art. III,

'3Supra note 59.
O'In reaching this conclusion the district court judge relied on Justice Clark's concurring opinion in Gideon v. Wainwright, supra note 23.
WAlden v. Montana, supra note 57, at 671.
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rather a first appearance before a magistrate. The court further failed
to make any explanation as to why this particular proceeding was a
"critical" stage in the criminal process as the Supreme Court did in
White v. Maryland.66 Finally the federal district court gave no consideration to the practical matter that there is no guarantee of a prelimi67
nary examination in Montana criminal procedure.
Perhaps there should be a right to assigned counsel for the protection of one's rights at criminal proceedings in which the accused is not
regularly present, for example at a grand jury proceeding or, in Montana,
at the hearing to determine if leave to file an information should be
granted. Although the defendant is not likely to be present at either of
these proceedings, his right to continued freedom may be determined on
the basis of a determination of probable cause to believe that he has committed an offense. However the main thrust of the White decision is not a
specific concern with the right to counsel at a preliminary examination
or any other proceeding to determine probable cause as such. Rather the
importance of counsel at a proceeding in which a plea of guilty was taken
and later introduced into evidence made the preliminary examination in
Maryland in the White case a critical stage in the proceedings. 6 8 Insofar
as the preliminary examination serves no purpose other than establishing
probable cause to believe the defendant has committed an offense and
should be held to answer, the presence of counsel should be no more
compelling and the proceeding should be deemed no more critical than a
grand jury investigation or a hearing to grant or deny leave to file an
information. However, if the preliminary examination also functions to
strengthen the prosecution's case by recording and perpetuating testimony
or by eliciting damaging admissions or pleas of guilty that may serve as
evidence at the trial, the proceeding is critical and the need for appointed
counsel becomes much more apparent. This conclusion is also compatible
with the decision in Escobedo v. Illinois69 which required the presence of
retained counsel during an investigation held prior to a preliminary
examination, prior to an indictment or information and prior to any arraignment as an essential of one's right to counsel under the sixth amendment and applicable to the states via the fourteenth amendment.7 0 Here
again, because police elicited damaging admissions the investigative stage
became "critical"-more critical perhaps than a preliminary examination.
If the Escobedo decision is extended to include the necessity of "appointed" counsel as well as retained counsel at the investigative stage,
after arrest and after the investigation "has begun to focus on a particular suspect .. "., as it may by reference to the reasoning and language
18upra note 59.
67

MONT. CONST. art. III,

§ 8; Comment, 25 MONT. L. REV. 135 (1963).

'White v. Maryland, supra note 59, at 60.

'84 Sup. Ct. 1758 (1964).
11d. at 1765.
71bid.
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in Gideon v. Wainwright, "any person haled into court, '7 2 White v. Maryland, "critical stage" 7 and the Douglas v. California theory of equality
between rich and poor defendants, 7 4 there still may remain some practical
and theoretical limitations on the right to counsel at preliminary examination. If the examination is solely limited to establishing probable
cause and if no evidence is obtained at the preliminary examination that
is or could be used to convict the defendant there is a far less compelling
need for counsel at this stage than during police interrogation. The
Escobedo decision is primarily concerned with interrogation conducted
without the presence of retained counsel after the focus of the investigation has narrowed to a particular suspect.
In another light, apart from the question of counsel at preliminary
examination, the Escobedo decision may have a powerful collateral impact.
In requiring counsel at the investigative stage the case may be imposing
upon the states a "little McNabb-Afallory rule 7' 5 which would require the
exclusion of any confession obtained from the accused during an unnecessary delay in furnishing him with legal counsel. The development of
Escobedo along these lines might be more protective than the McNabbMallory rule, particularly if it develops toward a demand that defense
counsel be present when any confession or admission is made if the confession or admission is to be admitted into evidence. This would mean
that a completely voluntary admission or confession given after counsel
had been appointed, and involving no illegal police conduct and no unnecessary delay in the criminal process at any point would be inadmissible if given at a time when counsel was not present; for example an
admission gratuitously made to a guard or fellow prisoner. The danger of
deceit, coercion or other unfairness could most certainly be effectively
removed if no confession or admission were admissible except those made
in the presence of defense counsel.
In the recent decision of Massiah v. United States7 6 the Supreme Court
pointed in this direction although the facts are not without alloy. The
petitioner, Massiah, was indicted and after retaining a lawyer pleaded
not guilty and was released on bail. Before trial, petitioner's cohort, one
Colson, in cooperation with government agents, engaged petitioner in an
incriminating conversation. The conversation was picked up by a hidden
radio transmitter and broadcast to a government agent. The Supreme
Court per Justice Stewart, held the government agent's testimony as to
the incriminating conversation inadmissible as violative of the specific
guarantees of the sixth amendment on the theory that government agents
"Gideon v. Wainwright, supra note 23, at 344.
"aWhite v. Maryland, supra note 59, at 60.
-'Douglas v. California, supra note 37, at 357.
75McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1942); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S.
449 (1957). The rule as stated by the McNabb and Mallory cases, supra, is that the
arrested person must be taken before a committing magistrate without unnecessary
delay, and failure to do so requires the exclusion of any confession or incriminating
evidence obtained prior to the presentment.
"084 Sup. Ct. 1199 (1964).
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had deliberately elicited from the defendant incriminating statements
after he had been indicted and when he was without the aid of counsel."
It should be noted that in this case the "damned" evidence was obtained
while defendant was free on bail and at a time when the officers of the
law were not imposing on the petitioner in any usual regard. But in the
words of the majority opinion the defendant "was denied the basic protections of that guarantee [the sixth amendment] when there was used
against him at his trial evidence of his own incriminating words, which
federal agents had deliberately elicited from him after he had been
indicted and in the absence of his counsel."7 8 It is true that in this case
the element of indirect interrogation was present, conceding that Colson
was acting as an agent of the government, but still the case seems to
come close to an extended "little McNabb-Mallory rule" that would exclude pretrial admissions or confessions whenever they are made without
benefit of counsel regardless of proof that there was no element of coercion and no delay in the criminal process.
As a practical matter this approach would effectuate the desire expressed by Justice Douglas that all admissions and confessions be excluded and the prosecution be forced to prove each element of each case
exclusively by physical evidence or by testimony of witnesses limited to
a portrayal of actions and excluding allusions to statements made by the
accused.7'9 As Mr. Justice White states in his dissent in the Massiah case:
This is nothing more than a thinly disguised constitutional policy
of minimizing or entirely prohibiting the use in evidence of voluntary out-of-court admissions and confessions made by the accused. Carried as far as blind logic may compel some to go, the
notion that statements from the mouth of the defendant should
not be used in evidence would have a severe and unfortunate
impact upon the great bulk of criminal cases.80
At a minimum the federal decisions seem headed to a conclusion that
due process requires the presence of counsel as soon as administratively
possible after arrest if leads, admissions, or confessions are to retain viable
evidentiary value. If the process employed does not elicit admissions or
confessions and does not secure leads, there is no effective means of
protecting the defendant's right to counsel 8l since there is nothing that
"Ibid.

"Id. at 1203.
"See, e.g., Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 57 (1949) (Douglas, J., dissenting). See
also, Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 203-04 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
"HMassiah v. United States, supra note 76, at 1204 (White, J., dissenting).
"'In Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 652-53 (1961), it was said: "The obvious futility of
relegating the Fourth Amendment to the protection of other remedies (other than
the exclusionary rule) has, moreover, been recognized by this Court since Wolf."
See also People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905, 911-12 (1955), where the
court said:
We have been compelled to reach that conclusion (that evidence obtained
in violation of the constitutional guarantees is inadmissible) because other
remedies have completely failed to secure compliance with the constitutional
provisions on the part of police officers with the attendant result that the courts
unde the old rule have been constantly required to participate in, and in effect
condone, the lawless activities of law enforcement officers.
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can be excluded unless it be the defendant. Violated rights not protected
by the exclusionary rule could be protected only by civil process or administrative remedy against the offending officer unless the Supreme Court
is prepared to hold that jurisdiction may be forfeited as a result of the
particular constitutional violation. If the loss of jurisdiction were to be
permanent (and anything less would be wholly farcical) this would grant
the defendant complete immunity from legal process for the crime with
which he would have been charged.
Any legitimate attempt to conform to a present understanding of
federal due process will require that every arrested person be taken before a magistrate without unnecessary delay and informed of his right
to counsel and, if unable to employ counsel that counsel will be assigned
to represent him at state expense. 2 Confessions and admissions made
prior to the time counsel is first made available to the defendant or at
any time subsequent thereto when counsel is not present must remain
suspect, notwithstanding the known importance of allowing police officers
the right to question the accused prior to affording him the right to
8 3
contact an attorney.
HOW COMPREHENSIVE IS THE RIGHT
TO ASSIGNED COUNSEL?
Historically in Montana the right to assigned counsel has continued
from and after arraignment, through trial, sentencing and appeal in all
cases originating in the district courts of the state. In other proceedings
such as habeas corpus, coram nobis, misdemeanor appeals and revocation
of probation, appointment of counsel has been at most discretionary and
rarely made.8 4 In 1959 the Montana Supreme Court, speaking through its
chief justice indicated that the right to assigned counsel after trial and
the right to free transcripts for indigent defendants was limited to
motions for new trial and felony appeals and did not encompass habeas
corpus, coram nobis or misdemeanor appeals.8 5 In making this statement
the court was giving its interpretation of the effect of Griffin v. Illinois6
on state court procedure. In Griffin the Supreme Court determined that
failure to provide an indigent defendant with a transcript at state cost
was a denial of due process and equal protection of the law inasmuch as
failure to have a transcript barred appellate review. "Appellate review
"Hllopefully the proposal of the Criminal Law Commission will adequately simplify the
initial procedure and sufficiently outline the requisite steps to accomplish this objective. The tentative draft proposes a first presentment before a magistrate without
unnecessary delay. At this first contact with a member of the judiciary the accused
person would be informed of his basic constitutional rights, and, if indigent, he
would be assigned counsel unless he waived the right thereto.
OSee, e.g., Crooker v. California, 357 U.S. 433, 441 (1958) ; Cicenia v. Lagay, 357 U.S.
504, 509 (1958); INBAU & REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 172,
203-09 (1962).
"LR.C.M.
1947, § 94-6512.
5

s WILKES, POST-CONVICTION CONSTITUTIONAL

RIGHTS OF INDIGENT

ANTS: STATE INTERPRETATIONS OF GRIFFIN V. ILLINOIS

-351 U.S. 12 (1956).
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has now become an integral part of the Illinois trial system ....*7 [and
a] state can no more discriminate on account of poverty than on account
of religion, race or color."88 Although the state of Montana has required
assigned counsel on all felony appeals for the benefit of indigent criminal
appellants and has required that they be furnished with transcripts at
state expense since 18959 a more guarded statement as to the limits of
assigned counsel might presently be made in view of the Douglas v. California case decided in 1963.90 Unlike Griffin, Douglas was not denied appellate review. The California rules of criminal procedure provide that
state appellate courts may make "an independent investigation of the
record and determine whether it would be of advantage to the defendant
or helpful to the appellate court to have counsel appointed."9' 1 By contrast, if counsel is employed by the appellant the court passes on the
merits of an appeal only after written briefs and oral arguments are
presented by counsel. In appraising the procedure and in applying it
to the case before the Court, in which the defendant had been denied the
aid of appointed counsel after appellate investigation of the record, the
Court stated:
Absolute equality is not required; lines can be and are drawn
and we often sustain them.9 2 But where the merits of the one and
only appeal an indigent has as of right are decided without
benefit of counsel, we think an unconstitutional line has been
drawn between rich and poor. 93
The latent breadth of the Douglas decision coupled with the immediate local concern over federal supervision of state court criminal proceedings by the expanding use and scope of habeas corpus9 4 may encour-

age the Montana Supreme Court to reconsider the need for assigned
counsel beyond the trial and sentencing stage in proceedings apart from
appeals and motions for new trials.
The Montana Supreme Court has noted on more than one occasion
8'Id. at 18.

MId. at 17.
R.C.M. 1947, § 93-1904.

However, in State v. Frodsham, 139 Mont. 222, 236, 362

P.2d 413, 420 (1961), the assigned attorneys were criticized for an unnecessarily
lengthy transcript and the district court judge was requested to examine into the
matter.
'Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
11Id. at 355.
"The Court cites Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141 (1940) and Goesaert v. Cleary, 335
U.S. 464 (1948). These cases upheld statutes which created special classes. In
Tigner the class exempt from criminal sanctions for combinations in restraint of trade
included farmers and stockmen. This exemption was held to be nonviolative of the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. In Goesaert the special class
of female persons eligible to be licensed as bartenders consisted only of wives and
daughters of male bar owners. It is doubtful that the lines drawn in either of these
cases or the reasons in support of them would justify the Court drawing a line
between rich and poor in any criminal case.
93
Douglas v. California, supra note 90, at 357.
"'See, e.g., Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963);
Application of Tomich, 221 F. Supp. 500 (D. Mont. 1963).
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that there is no statutory provision for appointment of counsel in the
supreme court and such appointments can be made only by the district
courtsY5 Notwithstanding these prior determinations the Montana Su-

preme Court is now making appointments of counsel where the circumstances seem to require it in hearings on petitions for writs of habeas
corpus. 96

In this same vein the Montana Supreme Court is presently considering New Jersey's Post Conviction Relief Rule 3:10A which requires ap97
pointment of counsel for all indigents seeking post conviction relief.

The Montana Supreme Court sees the rule as a means of providing the
most adequate relief possible by way of habeas corpus while at the same
time supplying a means of partially stemming the tide of repeated habeas
corpus petitions. The New Jersey rule calls for the assignment of counsel
in each case if indigency is proved, if the petitioner has not affirmatively
stated his intention to proceed pro se, and providing the petition is the
first one filed under the rule by the petitioner. As to subsequent petitions
attacking the same conviction, counsel would be assigned only upon
application therefor and upon a showing of good cause. 98 Although
habeas corpus is never res judicata99 the apparent attempt of the approach visualized by the Montana Supreme Court would be to make the
first hearing on a petition for a writ of habeas corpus as complete and
final as is possible.
Probably the biggest single difficulty in reviewing constitutional
safeguards via petitions for writs of habeas corpus is the failure to have
an adequate record to establish what did happen at the preliminary
examination and the arraignment. The law, the practice and the cases
coming before the federal district court in Montana raise in concert
the extreme importance not only of proceeding in accordance with federal requirements of due process but of making a very complete and careful record that is available to the reviewing court.
Beyond or separate from the right to counsel on appeal and for
hearings on petitions for writs of habeas corpus is the question of assigned counsel for hearings on revocation of probation. The critical constitutional question facing the convicted probationer is what constitutional rights, if any, does he retain as a probationer? Basically the United
States Constitution and the constitutions of most states fail to provide
any specific safeguards for the convicted defendant.' 00 The Supreme
"In re Pelke 's Petition, 139 Mont. 354, 359, 365 P.2d 932, 934 (1961); Brown v. State,
140 Mont. 289, 292, 371 P.2d 262, 263 (1962).

"Supra note 1. However, funds to pay for such appointments are not readily accessible and may force a restriction upon the number made.
"N.J. POST-CONVICTION
18N.J. POST-CONVICTION

RELIEF RULES

3:10A.

RELIEF RULES 3:10A.

ODarr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 214 (1950); Fay v. Noia, supra note 94, at 422.

'0With the possible exceptions of the commands against double jeopardy and cruel and
unusual punishment, the convicted defendant does not have any specific constitutional
safeguards. See U.S. CONST. amend. V and amend. VIII.
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Court in interpreting the Federal Probation Act noted that probation is
a privilege and cannot be demanded as a right. "'The court may revoke
or modify any condition of probation or may change the period of probation.' There are no limiting requirements as to the formulation of
charges, notice of charges, or manner of hearing or determination."' 1 1 The
question is best raised in a note in the 1959 Columbia Law Review: Is an
interest which is granted as a matter of grace and retained as a matter
of discretion altogether unprotected by the due process requirement of
the Constitution? The note then argues that such an interest may be
10 2
given protection in the light of certain recent Supreme Court decisions.
The same note points out that some states by statute grant a right to
retained counsel for a hearing on revocation of probation, and further,
some state courts have considered the right to retained counsel in such
hearings to be an element of due process.10'
The present Montana statutory law on probation, parole and clemency was enacted in 1955.104 It provides for a board of pardons consisting
of three appointed members charged with the responsibility of administering the "executive clemency, probation and parole system."' 0 5 The
act defines "probation" as "the release by the court without imprisonment . ..of a defendant found guilty of a crime upon verdict or plea,
subject to conditions imposed by the court and subject to the supervision
of the board upon direction of the court."'1 6 The statute provides for a
hearing on the breach of the conditions of release, which is to be conducted before the sentencing court which retains jurisdiction. The hearing is to be held without unnecessary delay after the arrest of the probationer is made.' 0 7 The probation officer is required to submit a written
report showing in what manner the defendant has violated the conditions
of release. The hearing may be and usually is informal and summary. If
the violation of the conditions of release is established the probation may
be revoked and the probationer's conditional freedom terminated. The
court may then order the defendant to serve the sentence imposed, any
lesser sentence, or if imposition of sentence was suspended, the court may
08
impose any sentence which might originally have been imposed.
Since the statutory law of the state of Montana specifies the procedure
which shall be followed in revoking probation, failure to follow such
procedures in each case should be construed as a violation of the equal
"0fBurns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216, 221 (1932).
"°'Note, Legal Aspects of Probation Revocation, 59 COLUM. L. REV. 311, 325 (1959).
'°SId. at 328.
"-R.C.M. 1947, §§ 94-9821 to -9851.
'-R.C.M. 1947, § 94-9822.
-R.C.M. 1947, § 94-9823(a).
M'R.C.M. 1947, § 94-9831.
"-R.C.M. 1947, § 94-9832. See also In re Williams, petition filed, No. 10826, July 17,
1964, now before the Montana Supreme Court testing the legality of certain aspects
of the law on suspended imposition of sentence. Basically the issue before the court
is whether jail-based probation and suspended imposition of sentence followed by
revocation of probation and imposition of sentence constitute double jeopardy.
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protection of the laws and unconstitutional. 0 9 Beyond any failure to
adhere to the procedures specified by statute, does the probationer have
a right to be represented by counsel at the hearing on revocation of probation under the procedure outlined in the Montana statute? It can
hardly be questioned that any proceeding which removes one from his
community and places him in confinement is of critical importance to him
and strongly affects his rights, if indeed he has any rights beyond those
specified in the statute.
Under existing Montana law the revocation of probation may subject
the probationer to the full force of the sentencing process. Hence if it is
concluded that an attorney is important at sentencing, and certainly both
assigned and retained counsel do continue to serve through judgment and
sentence, then the reason for an attorney's presence at a revocation of
probation hearing is d~ubly important. The hearing will not only ascertain facts to determine whether a condition of the release has been violated but also will conclude as a proceeding to sentence the probationer
on the original charge on which he was convicted.
There seems to be no real support for the existence of any absolute
right to counsel at'a hearing on revocation of probation. 11 0 However, if
retained counsel is permitted to appear and plead the case of the probationer at a revocation hearing it is conceivable the United States Supreme
Court would determine that a responsibility is imposed upon the court
to provide assigned counsel for an indigent probationer to satisfy the
requirements of fourteenth amendment equal protection of the laws."'
And in at least some revocation hearings in Montana the district courts
1 2
have permitted retained counsel to represent the probationer.
HOW COMPLETE IS THE PROTECTION AFFORDED
BY THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL?
Are there any weaknesses in the protective shield that prospectively
is to be held by all accused persons? Since at least some officers of the
law and of the courts are known to resort to devious and ignorant means
to solve crimes and to convict persons in derogation of constitutional
standards, are there any junctures or means by which the legal shield
for individual constitutional rights can be pierced by unscrupulous
officers of the law once there has been an effective implementation of
the right to counsel? First, there is no protection for the accused after
arrest and before counsel is obtained or provided, and since it is neither
administratively nor financially possible to provide patrol cars with de'O°Douglas v. California, supra note 90. In Hollandsworth v. United States, 34 F.2d
423 (4th Cir. 1929) the circuit court of appeals stated at 428: "The power of the
court to revoke a probation and sentence the probationer may not be exercised unless
it is made to appear that he has failed to comply with the terms and conditions
prescribed for him."
"'Supra note 102. See also R.C.M. 94-9835 providing for right to Counsel at hearings
before Board of Pardons.
"'Cf., Douglas v. California, supra note 90.
"2In re Williams, supra note 108.
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fense counsel this gap cannot be closed physically. It can be rendered
virtually impotent in the trial of the case by excluding all admissions and
confessions obtained before defense counsel is retained, assigned or
waived. Second, there is no protection after counsel is provided during
those periods when counsel is not present with the accused. This gap can
be rendered legally impotent only by excluding all admissions and confessions obtained in the absence of counsel. 113 Third, the defendant's
quality of protection may be in direct relation to the ability and conscientiousness of his counsel. This problem is one of the most difficult to
answer. Any meaningful solution must necessarily imply some kind of
control over the manner in which defense counsel conducts the case. Any
kind of control is a denial of the sanctity of the adversary system and
an anathema to most attorneys. Anathema or not, it is obvious that the
mere presence of counsel is no guarantee that the defendant will enjoy
the effective assistance of counsel.
To help insure the effective assistance of counsel the Supreme Court
has noted that the appointment of counsel must be made in such a manner
and at such a time as to give meaning to the requirement. 114 In State v.
Blakeslee' 5 the Montana Supreme Court stated specifically "the rule which
gives him [the accused] the right to counsel also means that counsel shall
be given reasonable time to prepare before trial.""' 6 In Blakeslee the
district court's failure to allow adequate time for preparation caused the
Montana Supreme Court to overturn the conviction and remand for new
11 7
trial.
Casual appointments and failure to allow defense counsel adequate
time to prepare are not the most usual shortcomings of the system of appointed counsel as it functions in Montana. Counsel in each county is
selected on a rotating basis from a list of local attorneys. (In capital
cases the judges regularly appoint two attorneys to defend the accused,
at least one of whom is selected on the basis of experience.) Statistical
evidence indicates that the lists are not comprehensive and not regularly
followed in all counties."" Young and less experienced attorneys are
given a majority of the appointments. Nearly one third of the reporting
"'3See text supra at 11 - 13 for consideration of this point in connection with discussion of Escobedo and Massiah cases.
"'Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); 1 DEFENDER NEWSLETTER 1 (Dec. 17, 1963).
It is also noted in the Newsletter that, in answering the demands of Gideon, 'some
judges have reverted to the last century in seeking short cuts that provide counsel
in name only, asking attorneys seated in the courtroom to have a brief talk with
indigent defendants who wish to plead guilty and assigning unpaid attorneys for
trials according to the old haphazard assigned counsel method." 1 DEFENDER NEWSLETTER,

supra.

n5131 Mont. 47, 306 P.2d 1103 (1957).
u'Id. at 54, 306 P.2d at 1106.
"'State v. Blakeslee, supra note 115. In the Blakeslee case counsel was appointed only
three days prior to trial and after withdrawal of the attorney previously retained by
the defendant. Further, the appointed counsel was engaged in another law suit during one of the three days prior to the trial. In the Powell case, supra note 114, counsel was assigned to represent the accused on the same day the trial was held.
'"Supra note 1.

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1964

19

Montana Law Review, Vol. 26 [1964], Iss. 1, Art. 1
MONTANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26,

attorneys stated that they had defended in fewer than five criminal cases
prior to their first appointment in 1962. One defense attorney stated that
the judge's list in his county included only young lawyers. 119 Generally
appointed defense attorneys have had far less legal experience than
county attorneys. This difference in experience is emphasized when the
comparison is based on experience in criminal law. Notwithstanding the
inequality of experience between county attorneys and appointed defense
attorneys, nearly all of the district court judges reported that appointed
counsel was regularly as capable as retained counsel as well as being
equal in ability and preparation to the county attorneys whom they opposed. It is, of course, possible that this conclusion is partially created by
two collateral factors. The court is likely to be more notably and permanently impressed if the case is of a very serious nature, in which event
counsel is apt to be selected from the ranks of the leading attorneys.
Further the case of an accused who is poorly represented is not likely to
appear very strong and the court might reasonably conclude that substantial justice is being done and defense counsel could not possibly do more
under the circumstances.
The question of competent counsel seems to be an increasingly regular complaint in petitions for writs of habeas corpus. 120 Perhaps part of
the problem is triggered by the courts explicit recognition that a different standard is applicable to appointed counsel vis a vis retained counsel.
In State v. Frodsham121 the court stated:
[Since the] defendant had no voice in the choice of such counsel,
...it appears to us that in the interest of justice it is incumbent
upon us to consider the contended errors in spite of the fact
that we have had to dismiss the appeal, 122 a far different situation would confront us here if the defendant had employed his
own counsel, in which instance it would be the exercise of his
23
own judgment on the ability of such counsel as he chose.1
In Jones v. Montana124 the conviction was overturned by the Federal
District Court for the District of Montana because the court was convinced that counsel had failed to adequately advise the accused of the
difference between first and second degree burglary before allowing him
to plead guilty to first degree burglary. The most obvious danger presented by such cases is that they tend to take the control of the case
away from the defense attorney. In the Jones case there was undoubtedly
some bargaining. Prior convictions were not charged and the sentence
19Supra note 1.
'1Supranote 1. See, e.g., Jones v. Montana, 235 F.Supp. 673 (D. Mont. 1964).
121139 Mont. 222, 362 P.2d 413 (1961).
'2Id. at 233, 362 P.2d at 418-19.
'12Id. at 232, 362 P.2d at 418. The majority view seems to be that there is a significant
legal distinction between retained and assigned counsel. See Annot., 74 A.L.R.2d 1390,
1406-11 (1960).
lSupra note 120.
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given the defendant was less than could have been given him upon conviction of second degree burglary with prior convictions. 125
It is a substantial question if second guessing trial counsel has any
merit. The strategy of either a bargaining process or a trial may dictate
action that in the floodlight of the sentence or the conviction appears
unreasoned and incompetent. However, this may result from either the
nature of the bargaining in the criminal process or the ineptness of some
of our criminal procedures which allow a case to proceed on innuendo
and inference which defense counsel cannot combat except by emphasizing them. This often means a calculated risk that looks like either the
careful hand of legal genius after acquittal or the stupidity of careless
and thoughtless counsel after conviction.
While availability of competent counsel is an essential aspect of the
American system of criminal justice, court control over the actions and
strategy of defense counsel should be exercised with great caution and
restraint. Duly qualified members of the bar should be indulged every
presumption of professional competency. When a breach is brought to
the attention of the court, the court presumptively must act to safeguard
the rights of the individual who has suffered at the hand of incompetent
counsel. Reversals for incompetent counsel may, in many cases, allow the
defendant to attempt dubious stratagems on the theory that if they are
unsuccessful he can proceed again by showing the incompetence of
counsel in utilizing such tactics. If court supervision of defense counsel is
to be even limitedly exercised and sanctioned, it is doubtful that any
good reason can be forwarded to limit this supervision to assigned counsel
when the breach may be just as gross and the individual's rights just as
sacred in the case of retained counsel.
A final consideration is the questionable protection that is afforded
an accused person at every stage of the criminal process if counsel is
waived. In Johnson v. Zerbst 126 the Supreme Court gave some indication
of its attitude concerning the question of waiver:
The constitutional right of an accused to be represented by
counsel invokes, of itself, the protection of a trial court, in
which the accused-whose life or liberty is at stake-is without
counsel. This protecting duty imposes the serious and weighty
responsibility upon the trial judge of determining whether there
is an intelligent and competent waiver by the accused. While an
accused may waive the right to counsel, whether there is a
proper waiver should be clearly determined by the trial court,
and it would be fitting and appropriate for that determination to
appear upon the record.

127

" Jones v. Montana, supra note 120. First degree burglary is punishable by imprisonment of not more than fifteen years nor less than one year. Second degree burglary
is punishable by imprisonment for not more than five years. R.C.M. 1947, § 94-903.
See also, R.C.M. 1947, § 94-4713 dealing with prior convictions.

'1304 U.S. 458 (1938).
27

1 1d. at 465.
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If this interpretation of effective waiver of counsel is imposed upon the
states, as well it might be,'128 many questions can be raised and few immediate answers can be given. To make a waiver of counsel effective
must the accused be experienced in the criminal process? Must he be of
average or superior intelligence? Is it requisite that he have had sub129
stantial formal education? Must he be over some specified age?
If the trial court must determine the effectiveness of a waiver what
happens to admissions or confessions given to police officers after the
defendant becomes entitled to counsel in those cases in which counsel
has supposedly been waived but the propriety of the waiver has not been
determined by the trial court? Is it then impossible to waive counsel
before a justice of the peace at preliminary examination? Must the effectiveness of such a waiver be reconsidered at a later stage by the trial
court? If so, what is the effect of the preliminary examination? Further,
since Johnson v. Zerbst urges that a record of the determination of the
meaningfulness of any waiver be kept, 130 will proof of waiver which is
satisfactory to deny petitioner a writ of habeas corpus be nothing less than
a complete record, and will any proceedings prior to the date of the
recorded proceedings be naturally suspect insofar as the accused appeared
without counsel?
Finally, the police officers and officers of the court may have an
opening wedge to apply their devious arts by sub rosa encouragement of
waiver of counsel through the bargaining process' 31 or by the severity of
the sentence meted out to convicted defendants who do not waive
counsel. 13 2 The recent Alden decision 33 bears directly upon this question.
The accused, Alden, appeared before a justice of the peace and was advised of his right to counsel and that he would have a right to appointed
counsel when he was brought before the district court. After this appearance the petitioner asked the advice of the county attorney as to
whether he should ask for a preliminary hearing and an attorney. The
county attorney refused to advise the petitioner but informed him that
if he continued to cooperate he would not file prior felony charges, but
msIn 1 DEFENDER NEWSLETTER, supra note 114, at 5, it

is pointed out that "since
Gideon applied the Sixth Amendment counsel provision to the states . . . [and] because Johnson was the key case interpreting the Sixth Amendment, its language
regarding waiver might now . . . apply to the states . . . [although] the rule does

not seem to be . . . based on constitutional considerations.
'The tentative draft of the Montana Criminal Law Commission proposes to deny the
right to waive counsel to anyone under the age of eighteen years charged with a
felony.
'1Johnson v. Zerbst, supra note 126, at 465.

'mAlden v. Montana, 234 F. Supp. 661 (D. Mont. 1964).
'See United States v. Wiley, 184 F. Supp. 679, (N.D. Ill. 1960) in which Judge
Campbell of the United States District Court of Illinois in sentencing the defendant
stated at 681: "Had there been a plea of guilty in this case probably probation
might have been considered under certain terms, but you are all well aware of the
standing policy here that once a defendant stands trial that element of grace is
removed from the consideration of the court in imposition of sentence."

The court

of appeals overturned the sentence. United States v. Wiley, 278 F.2d 500 (7th cir.
1960).

mAlden v. Montana, supra note 131.
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol26/iss1/1
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if petitioner pleaded not guilty in district court, then the prior felony
charges would be filed. Petitioner then waived counsel, pleaded guilty
and was bound over to district court. Under these circumstances the
federal court held that the petitioner had been denied "his right to the
assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. ' 13 4 In reaching this conclusion the federal court answered the State's argument that petitioner
expressly waived the appointment of counsel saying:
[T]he waiver of
proceedings must
purported waiver
in Justice Court,

counsel at that stage [district court] of the
necessarily have been influenced by the prior
of counsel and pleas of guilty without counsel
and by the threat of prior conviction charges

135
hanging over his head.

CONCLUSION
Is the activity of the federal judiciary and the present course it has
charted in criminal procedure an aberration likely to be destructive of our
law and society, or is it the logical and reasonable course toward a solution of the difficult problem of administering criminal law within the
confines of fair process? It is exceedingly difficult to dispute the logic
and essential fairness of requiring the presence of defense counsel at
every stage of every criminal proceeding as long as we remain committed
to an adversary system of criminal justice. The real concern to law enforcement officials is not the abstract right to counsel, but rather the
collateral impact of the means of effectively implementing that right.
According to the reports of Montana county attorneys, a majority of all
crimes in the state are solved by the accused's own admission or confession. This conclusion seems to be in accord with the findings of Professor Inbau, former Director, Chicago Police Scientific Crime Detection
Laboratory and Mr. Reid, former staff member, who claim:
Many criminal cases, even when investigated by the best
qualified police departments, are capable of solution only by
means of an admission or confession from the guilty individual
or upon the basis of information obtained from the questioning
of other criminal suspects.1 36 [And further,] criminal offenders
...ordinarily will not admit their guilt unless questioned under
conditions of privacy and for a period of perhaps several
13 7
hours. '

The Supreme Court has on occasion noted the importance of police inter'T Id. at 673.

-5Id.at 672. The case is clouded in this particular regard since the defendant was
never offered appointed counsel prior to reaching the district court, there being no

provision for appointed counsel in justice court at first appearance or for preliminary
examination.
'INBAU
& REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONs 204 (1962).
t
'"
Id.at 206.
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rogation. 13 However, in contrast to any acceptance of the importance
of police interrogation is the statement in Escobedo v. Illinois:
We have learned the lesson of history, ancient and modern,
that a system of criminal law enforcement which comes to depend
on the "confession" will, in the long run, be less reliable and more
subject to abuses than a system which depends on extrinsic
13
evidence independently secured through skillful investigation. 1
It is perhaps unfortunate that the Court did not make a more complete explanation of the stated problem in the context of the Escobedo
case. Are we to infer that admissions or confessions are bad per se? Uncorroborated admissions or confessions may be suspect; coerced confessions are suspect and opposed to existing standards of fair conduct; but
uncoerecd and corroborated admissions and confessions are undoubtedly
an important means of ascertaining facts that may be known only to the
perpetrator of the crime. It seems of dubious validity to refuse information which can be corroborated and which is not tainted by any coercion.
This does not argue for reliance upon confessions or admissions but it
does argue for the use of all legitimate means to ascertain fact. It is certainly the height of absurdity to close our eyes to any available evidence
which is neither unbelievable nor tainted by active police illegality. Admittedly this conclusion begs the question. Is it illegal police conduct to
interrogate the accused without the presence of defense counsel? If confessions and admissions are not to be used unless-made in the presence of
defense counsel and if defense counsel is found to be incompetent if he
allows the accused to confess-the ring is closed. And what will be the
end thereof? Will effective law enforcement disintegrate, as many law
enforcement officers claim? Will ways be found to circumvent the protection? Hopefully the logical and fair implementation of the right to
counsel will cause us to re-evaluate the adversary system of criminal
justice. Such a re-evaluation should lead immediately to a redefinition
of the role counsel plays in the criminal process. Defense counsel of the
old school remain prideful of their ability to exploit the technical errors
of opposing counsel and weaknesses in the law; they are prideful of their
ability to surprise the county attorney and to hypnotize a jury. These
game techniques must be eliminated and all legal endeavor directed toward the search for fact within the confines of fair process. The criminal
law must encourage full discovery procedures, adequate notice and increased ethical responsibility on the part of both defense counsel and
prosecutor. If this be too idealistic and generally without practical significance then a still more radical modification of the adversary system
must be demanded.
18In Cicencia v. Lagay, 357 U.S. 504 (1958),

the Court states at 509: "'[It

can

hardly be denied that adoption of petitioner's position would constrict state police
activities in a manner that in many instances might impair their ability to solve
difficult cases." See also Croocker v. California, 357 U.S. 433 (1958).
'OEscobedo v. Illinois, 84 Sup. Ct. 1758, 1764 (1964).
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TABLE II
County-

Felony
Arrests
1962

Cascade .......... 74
Yellowstone ..121
Ravalli .......... 18
Lewis & Clark 40
Musselshell .... 7

Per Cent
Indigent

%
Indigent
Waiving
Counsel

Lawyers
In
Private
Practice

No. of Appointments
of Counsel
In Felonies
1962

75
70
80
85
70

35
83
30
35
80

93
114
9
72
4

27
13
12
14
1

Typical
No. of
Lawyers
Serving

25
9
4
7
1

Payment
for Felony
Guilty
Plea

$100.
75.
150.
75.
50.

TABLE III
Senior Defense
Attorneys'

Junior Defense
2
Attorneys

Total

Is Counsel Appointed Early Enough?
Yes ............... ; ..................................................... 12
10
22
No ...........................................................
2
3
5
No Answer ---------------------------------------------------1
1

Is the Present System Fair?
Yes ......................................................................
8
9
17
No ...........................................................
5
3
8
No Answer ........................................................
2
1
3
Is Compensation Adequate?
Yes ......................................................................
No ........................................................................
' Attorneys who have been practicing 10 or more
more criminal cases.
'Attorneys who have been practicing

than 10 criminal cases.

2
13

7
6

9
19

years or who have handled 10 or

less than 10 years and have handled fewer
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TABLE IV
Senior
Judges'

1. Ideal Stage for Appointment
of Counsel
Between Arrest and First
Appearance ............................ 2
At First Appearance -------_----Between First Appearance and
Preliminary Hearing ......
At Preliminary Hearing ..........
At Arraignment ........................ 7
No Answer ...........................
2. Kind of Cases and Proceedings
for Which Counsel Should Be
Appointed
Sentencing ...:-----------------------------8
Habeas Corpus, Coram Nobis,
Other Posteonviction Remedies ..........................................
5
Hearing on Revocation of
Probation ................................ 4
Sexual Psychopath Hearing -_ 4
Misdemeanors ----------------------- 1
Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill ..................-----------2

Junior
County
Attorneys'

Junior
Judges2

Senior
County 3
Attorneys

3

1
6

6

9

10

33

2

12

10

29

2

6

5

15

3. Is Present Compensation
Adequate?
Yes ---------------------------------------------9
No -----------------------------------------------0
No Answer .............................
4. Should Out of Pocket Expenses
Be Paid?
Yes ..................----------------------14
8
8
21
N o .............
1..................................
1
2
No Answ er .................................. 4
10
9
28
t Judges "who have served on the bench 10 or more years.
Judges who have served on the bench less than 10 years.
RCounty attorneys who have been county attorneys 5 or more years.
'County attorneys who have been county attorneys less than 5 years.
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TABLE V
Amounts Spent for Defense of Indigent Accused in 1962-631
Dollar Amount

Population

County

$38002
80262
30 00
2050

79,016
Yellowstone ......................................................
Cascade .......................................................... 73,418
L ew is & C la rk .............................................. 28 ,00 6
R a v a lli .............................
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... 1 2 ,3 4 1

Sample appropriations throughout the state show unusual variations not based on population: For
example, Gallatin County has appropriated $1100 for 1964-65 with a population of 26,045; Missoula
County has appropriated $2000 for 1964-65 with a population of 46,454, and Silver Bow County has
appropriated $4500 for 1964-65 with a population of 44,663.
The Gallatin figure may be misleading inasmuch as Gallatin County spent $1860 for assigned counsel
in 1963-64 by tapping emergency funds.
Silver Bow County may have inadequate funds during the present fiscal year since $3534 has already
been spent, primarily, as a result of one trial in which assigned counsel (2) received $1884.
2 The amounts appropriated for the 1964-65 fiscal year in Yellowstone and Cascade Counties show
minimal increases over prior years. The Yellowstone appropriation for 1964-65 is $3800 and the
Cascade appropriation for 1964-65 is $9000.

1

TABLE VI
Retained and Assigned Counsel in Felonies
Did Defendant
Have Counsel?
Count -

Total
Sample

Case ade ................ 20
Ravaalli ................ 17
Yell owstone ....... 50
Weighted Total
Percentages ......

1962

-Montana,

Yes
No.%

No
No.%

Retained
No. %

Assigned
No. %

14 70
13 87
29 58

6 30
2 13
21 42

3 15
1 7
16 32

11 55
11 73
13 26

71

29

19

50

Comblnation
or Type
Unknown
No. %

0
1
0

No Data
N o. %

0
7
0

0 0
2 12
0 0

2

4

TABLE VII
Was Felony Defendant Determined to Be Indigent?
County -

Total
Sample

C ascade ............................... 20
R avalli ................................ 17
Yellowstone ..................... 50

No

Yes
No.

%*

No.

%*

No Data
No.
%

12
15
13

63
100
45

7
0
16

37
0
55

1
2
21

5
12
42

* Percentages were calculated without including the "no data" cases.

TABLE VIII
Frequency of Release on Bail of Felony Defendants.
County -

Total
Sample

Yes
No.
%*

No
No.
%*

20
2
11
17
Cascade ..................................
12
24
38
Yellowstone .......................... 50
Ravalli .................................. 17
2
17
10
* Percentages were calculated without including the "no data" cases.
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No Data
No.
%

1
0
5

0
0
29
28
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TABLE IX
Disposition in Felony Cases-Montana, 1962
Total
Sample

County -

Plea
Dismissed

Guilty

Cascade -----------------------20
14
Ravalli -----------------------17
14
Yellowstone -------------50
35
Weighted Total
Percentages ................
74

Found
Guilty

Mental
Commitment

Pending

1

0

1

0

2

2
0

1

6

4
0
8

1
5

12

7

TABLE X
Sentencing in Felony Cases-Montana, 1962
County-

Total
Sample

No
Sentence
No.
%

Prison
No.
%

Probation
No.
%

Suspended
Sentence
No.
%

Fine
No.
%

Cascade ............ 20
Ravalli --------- 17

6
2

30
12

5
9

25
53

7
6

35
35

2
1

10
6

0
0

0
0

Yellowstone .... 50

10

20

27

54

0

0

12

24

2

4

Weighted Total
Percentages

21

44

23

14

1

If a sentence was any combination of prison, probation, suspended sentence (without probation),
and fine, it is recorded under each of these columns.
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